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To study the impacts of reductions in employer’s social security con-
tributions, we construct an intertemporal general equilibrium model with
diﬀerent types of workers (and wages), search unemployment and endoge-
nous job destruction rates. Our model reproduces the empirical evidence
that the impacts on employment, of reductions in contributions at the
minimum wage level, go through a decrease in job destructions rather
than an increase in job creations. We moreover ﬁnd that, although it is
prejudicial to average productivity, reductions targeted at the minimum
wage create much more net employment than reductions targeted at other
wages.
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Over the last decades, the increase in labor taxation has been particularly sig-
niﬁcant in continental Europe . As a result, at the end of the 90’s, the tax wedge
on labor1 in European countries was roughly twice as high than in Anglo-Saxon
countries (ﬁgure 1). In a recent paper, Prescott (2003) emphasizes the eﬀects of
employee’s taxation on the labor supply. From a business cycle model, he writes
the labor supply as a function of the employee’s labor tax rate. For diﬀerent
G7 countries, he shows that the predicted labor supply is close to the actual
one, and concludes that tax rates alone account for most of the diﬀerences in
labor supply in the major advanced industrial countries. But the labor taxation,
especially the employer’s taxation, also aﬀects the labor demand and is often
put forward to explain the high EU unemployment rate. In this paper, we con-
struct a general equilibrium model to investigate the eﬀects on labor demand of
a reduction in employer’s taxation.
In many EU countries, this type of policy has become popular over the last few
years. For instance, in France, the ”Jupp´ e reform” implemented in the second
half of the 90’s, strongly reduced employer’s contributions at the ”SMIC” level2.
Recently, the Belgian government also decreased employer’s contributions for
several categories of workers. Since the costs involved by these reductions are
often important, it is crucial to have eﬃcient implementations of the policies.
It is well-known that labor demand for the low-skilled is more elastic to wages
than labor demand for the high-skilled (see Hamermesh (1993) for a synthesis).
As a result, a reduction in the contributions targeted at low wages may well
be more eﬀective in stimulating employment than reductions targeted at high
wages, partially oﬀset by rises in these bargained wages. Eﬀects could still be
larger if the reductions are targeted at rigid minimum wage3. On the other hand,
favoring low-skilled employment (usually low wages employment) relatively to
the high-skilled may harm the productivity of the economy and in ﬁne the total
employment.
In the French literature, several papers estimate the eﬀects of reductions at the
SMIC level. Using microeconomic data, Laroque and Salani´ e (2000) and Cr´ epon
and Desplatz (2001) ﬁnd quite important increases in employment. Cr´ epon and
Desplatz (2002) also ﬁnd that rises in employment are almost fully due to a
sudden fall in job destruction rather an increase in job creation, and that most
of the job adjustment is already realized after two years. These last observations
are similar to those of Kramarz and Philippon (2000). They estimate the elas-
ticity of transition probabilities (from employment to unemployment and from
1The tax wedge is deﬁned as the diﬀerence (in percentage of the gross wage) between the
wage cost for the ﬁrm and the household’s net available income. This includes the social
contributions paid by the employer, the social contributions paid by the employee, and the
personal income tax.
2The SMIC means Salaire minimum interprofessionnel de croissance and is the French
minimum wage.
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Figure 1: Tax wedge as a percentage of gross labor cost. Source: OECD (2000)
unemployment to employment) with respect to the minimum wage cost and ob-
tain a highly positive elasticity for the employment to unemployment transition
probability, and a not signiﬁcant elasticity for the unemployment to employment
transition probability. Several macroeconomic models, calibrated on the French
economy, also try to produce estimations of the eﬀects of contribution reduc-
tions at the minimum wage level4. More recently, Cahuc (2003) and Ch´ eron,
Hairault, and Langot (2003) develop models with matching, however they usu-
ally obtain smaller eﬀects than those estimated by empirical micro studies. It is
nevertheless worth noting that they assume an exogenous job destruction rate.
In other words, in their models all employment eﬀects go through job creation
rather than job destruction, which seems, given Kramarz and Philippon (2000)
and Cr´ epon and Desplatz (2002), counter-factual.
In Belgium, Sneessens and Shadman (2000), Stockman (2002), Hendrickx, Joyeux,
Masure, and Stockman (2003) or Burggraeve and Du Caju (2003), to only men-
tion the more recent contributions, econometrically estimate the eﬀects of re-
ductions in social contributions on employment. They mainly conﬁrm that em-
ployment increase is higher if the reduction is targeted at low wages. However,
there is no Belgian speciﬁc estimation of reductions targeted at the minimum
wage5.
The contribution of this paper is twofold. Firstly, we build on the existing
theoretical matching literature by adding endogenous job destruction rate, to
be able to compare our results with empirical evidences. Secondly, we calibrate
our intertemporal general equilibrium model, on Belgian data6, and we evaluate
4See for instance Granier and Nyssen (1996) for an OLG model, Laﬀargue (2000) or Salani´ e
(2000) for macro-econometric models,...
5Contrary to France where there is a unique SMIC, the minimum wage in Belgium may be
diﬀerent across sectors. However, it is generally estimated that 10% of the workers are paid
at one of the sectoral minimum wages (see the calibration section and appendix 2).
6Economic situation in Belgium is close to those observed on average at the European level.
3the eﬀects of reductions in employer’s contributions, targeted at diﬀerent types
of wages (very low wages or minimum wage, low wages, high wages, and all
wages), not only on the employment but also on the welfare of individuals
and on the economy’s productivity. More precisely, we use the Pierrard and
Sneessens (2003) general equilibrium framework with two types of workers (low-
and high-skilled), two types of jobs (simple and complex) and possible crowding-
out of the low-skilled by the high-skilled7. We add a minimum wage (all wages
are bargained but workers are protected by a minimum wage if the bargained
outcome is lower than the minimum wage) and endogenous job destruction rates,
following Joseph, Pierrard, and Sneessens (2004).
Our main ﬁndings are: (i) Simulating a reduction in the minimum wage cost,
we reproduce empirical facts showing that most of the eﬀects on employment
go through the lower job destruction rate rather than the job creation rate.
Moreover, again as in empirical studies, adjustment is almost complete after
ten periods (between two and three years). (ii) Our quantitative eﬀects on
employment when reductions are at the minimum wage level are higher than
those of previous theoretical papers. This can be explained by the fact that
they assume exogenous job destruction rates. (iii) Reductions targeted at the
minimum wage create ten times more employment, mainly for the low-skilled,
than reductions targeted at high wages. This policy seems therefore suitable
in countries with high low-skilled unemployment rates. The productivity of the
economy, however, highly decreases.
The model is developed in the next section and the calibration, as well as the
simulation results, are reproduced in section 3. Section 4 provides some discus-
sions and extensions, and the last section concludes.
The analysis for the Belgian case may thus provide insights for other European countries as
well.
7Pierrard and Sneessens (2003) show that job competition was important in Belgium to
explain the relative unemployment rates. See also section 4.1 for a discussion.
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We construct a two-tier productive structure with three types of agents: inter-
mediate ﬁrms, representative households, and a representative ﬁnal ﬁrm. As
in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), intermediate ﬁrms are single-job8 and are
hit each period by an idiosyncratic productivity shock. They hold either a
simple job, to produce a ”low-tech” intermediate good, or a complex job, to
produce a ”high-tech” intermediate good. There are two representative house-
holds, one composed of the low-skilled and the other one of the high-skilled9.
The low-skilled can only work on simple jobs while the high-skilled can work
on simple jobs (crowding out the low-skilled) or on complex jobs. We allow for
this ﬂexibility (rather than perfectly segmented labour markets) because this
”de-qualiﬁcation” possibility has been highlighted by several studies as an im-
portant feature of the European labour markets (see for instance Hartog (2000)
or Pierrard and Sneessens (2003)). Low-skilled household has labor and un-
employment incomes that are entirely consumed. High-skilled household has
labor income but also dividends (they own the intermediate ﬁrms) and capital
income, which can be consumed or invested10. Finally, the representative ﬁnal
ﬁrm uses the low-tech goods, the high-tech goods, as well as capital to produce
a num´ eraire ﬁnal good. The model is developed in discrete time and detailed
in the next subsections.
2.1 Labor Market Flows
Total labor force is normalized to 1 and consists of a ﬁx proportion 1−α (resp. α)
of low-skilled (resp. high-skilled) workers11. The low-skilled can be unemployed
(Ul
t) or work on a simple job (Nl
t), and the high-skilled can be unemployed (Uh
t ),
work on a simple job (Nh
t ) or work on a complex job (Nc
t ). This gives:
1 − α = Ul
t + Nl




The high-skilled unemployed search for simple jobs (resp. complex jobs) with an
endogenous search eﬃciency Ss
t (resp. Sc
t). The high-skilled working on simple
jobs also search for complex jobs with an endogenous search eﬃciency So
t .T h e
8The main motivation to the introduction of single job intermediate ﬁrms is to keep a
tractable representation of the wage bargaining process.
9This representative households formulation amounts to assuming that, within each house-
hold, workers are perfectly insured against the unemployment risk. This simpliﬁcation is
common in the literature (see for instance Merz (1995) or Andolfatto (1996)) and reﬂects the
current state of the art. Taking into account workers heterogeneity inside each household, due
to imperfect insurance markets would make the model totally intractable.
10By simplicity, we assume that only high-skilled are capitalists.
11This paper does not focus on the education process. To illustrate the eﬀects of labor
market policies on vocational training, see for instance Ch´ eron, Hairault, and Langot (2003).
5search eﬃciency of the low-skilled worker is normalized to 112.
If we denote the stock of simple (resp. complex) vacancies by V s
t (resp. V c
t ), the
numbers of contacts at each period for simple and complex jobs are respectively
deﬁned by:
Ms


















where Mi, with i ∈{ s,c}, satisﬁes the usual Inada conditions. The probabilities
for a ﬁrm to have a contact for a simple vacancy (qs
t) and a complex vacancy
(qc














More precisely, for a simple vacancy, the probabilities to have a contact with a
low-skilled (qsl
t ) or a high-skilled (qsh






















In the same way, ps
t (resp. pc
t) is the probability for an eﬃcient job seeker to




















The timing on the labor market is the following: at time t, new matches are
created; at the beginning of time t + 1, matches (new or already existing) are
hit by idiosyncratic productivity shocks, wages are (re)negotiated and some
matches are destroyed. By denoting χl
t, χh
t and ψt the job destruction rates for
respectively the simple jobs ﬁlled with the low-skilled, the simple jobs ﬁlled with
the high skilled and the complex jobs, the dynamics of employment is described,
in terms of the job seekers’ search eﬀort, by:
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All these endogenous labor market ﬂows are summarized in ﬁgure 2.
12We do not introduce an endogenous participation rate (see for instance Engstr¨ om, Holm-
lund, and Kolm (2001) or Garibaldi and Wasmer (2001) for such a modelization). This is
consistent with empirical evidences (Piketty (1998) or Blundell and MaCurdy (1999)) show-
ing that the elasticity of labor supply with respect to wage is weak.





Figure 2: Labor market ﬂows
2.2 Intermediate Firms
Intermediate ﬁrms are either ”high-tech” ﬁrms (complex jobs with high-skilled
workers) or ”low-tech” ﬁrms (simple jobs with low- or high-skilled workers). At
each period, each intermediate ﬁrm is hit by an idiosyncratic productivity shock
x, drawn from a cdf F13.
High-tech ﬁrms
A complex job is proﬁtable if the idiosyncratic productivity shock x is higher
than the reservation productivity for both the ﬁrm (R
F,c
t ) and the high-skilled
household (R
H,c





t }. The asset value of an
intermediate ﬁrm with a complex vacancy is therefore14:
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V,c






















where b is the per-period complex vacancy opening cost and ˜ βt is the rate at





















13Without loss of generality, we assume the same F for both types of ﬁrms.
14Contrary to Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), we do not assume that jobs start at the
highest available productivity, which would necessitate to make the distinction between ”new
jobs” and ”old jobs”. We also assume we have no employment protection (see section 4.2 for
a discussion).
7where dc
t is the price of an intermediate high-tech good and wc
t is the wage. The











If a simple job is held by a low-skilled, it is proﬁtable if the idiosyncratic pro-
ductivity shock x is higher than the reservation productivity for both the ﬁrm
(R
F,l
t ) and the low-skilled household (R
H,l






If the simple job is held by a high-skilled, it is proﬁtable if x is higher than the
reservation productivity for both the ﬁrm (R
F,h
t ) and the high-skilled household
(R
H,h





t }. The asset value of an intermediate
ﬁrm with a simple vacancy is therefore:
W
V,s





































where a is the per-period simple vacancy opening cost. The asset values of
a ﬁrm producing a low-tech good with a low-skilled (W
F,l
t ) and a high-skilled
(W
F,h


















































t is the price of an intermediate low-tech good and wl
t (resp. wh
t )i st h e
wage for a low-skilled (resp. high-skilled) working on a simple job. The supply

















8Reservation productivity and free entry conditions









= 0 with i ∈{ l,h,c}, (19)
and the free entry condition gives:
W
V,i
t = 0 with i ∈{ s,c}. (20)
2.3 Households
We have two representative households, one composed of the low-skilled and
one composed of the high-skilled. Inside each household, members are perfectly
insured against unemployment risk.
Low-skilled household













t is the low-skilled consumption, U is an increasing and concave utility
function, Dl is an increasing and convex work disutility function, and β is the
psychological discount factor. The low-skilled pay no tax and consume all their









t is the unemployment beneﬁts (determined in one exogenous policy
process) and ¯ wl














is developed in appendix 3.
High-skilled household


















The decision variables of the high-skilled household are the consumption level Ch
t
and the search eﬀorts of job seekers. High-skilled unemployed workers allocate
9their total search time (normalized to one) between the simple (ect) and the
complex job markets (1 − ect). Their search eﬃciency on the complex (resp.
simple) job market, denoted Sc
t (resp. Ss
t) is an increasing and concave function
of the search time devoted to that market (ect and (1−ect) respectively). High-
skilled workers employed on a simple job may spend a fraction eot of their leisure
time searching for a better paid complex job. Their on-the-job search eﬃciency
So
t is an increasing concave function of eot. Do is an increasing and convex on-
the-job search disutility function, and Dc is an increasing and convex complex
work disutility function15. This maximization is subject to equations (1), (10),










t +( rt + δ)Kt
−Kt+1 +( 1− δ)Kt − Tt. (25)
The high-skilled own the intermediate ﬁrms and Πs
t (resp. Πc
t) represents the
dividends paid by the simple (resp. complex) ﬁrms. They also lend their capital
stock Kt, which provides a real interest rate rt but depreciates at rate δ. Finally,
they are subject to a lump-sum tax Tt to ﬁnance the unemployment beneﬁts.
The average wages ¯ wh
t (resp. ¯ wc
t) paid to a high-skilled working on a simple


















The ﬁrst order conditions (equality between marginal costs and expected margi-


































































are developed in appendix 3.
15The simple work disutility is represented by the independent term of function Do.
10Reservation productivity, destruction rate and discount rate


































t ),ψ t = F(Rc
t), (31)
and the rate at which future proﬁts are discounted:





























where the production function F satisﬁes the usual Inada conditions. The de-
mand for the three inputs is given by the ﬁrst order conditions:








At each period, wages are (re)negotiated between the ﬁrm and the corresponding
household. These bargained wages (respectively for a low-skilled worker, for a
high-skilled working on a simple job and for a high-skilled working on a complex





































































11where ηi, with i ∈{ l,h,c}, is the corresponding households’ bargaining power16.
By using the asset value equations of section 2.2 (equations (12), (13), and (15)
to (17)), the marginal welfare equations deﬁned in appendix 3 (equations (61)
to (63)), as well as the deﬁnitions of the reservation productivity (equations (19)
and (30)) and the free entry conditions (equations (20)), we can solve equa-
tions (37) to (39) and rewrite the bargained wages:
w
b,l
















Up to now, it was implicitly assumed that the minimum wage restriction is not
binding. However, these negotiations are bounded downwards by a minimum
wage wm







t with i ∈{ l,h,c}. (43)
Introducing this constraint into equations (40)-(42), we obtain the wage wi
t,































We ﬁrst calibrate our model on Belgian data and discuss the exogenous policy
process for wu
t and wm
t . We use it then to simulate reductions in employer’s
social security contributions.
3.1 Calibration





, with i ∈{ s,c}, (48)
16The ﬁrms asset values are expressed in the num´ eraire good while the households’ welfare
are in consumption utility. To normalize, we divide the marginal welfare by the marginal
utility as, for instance, in Merz (1995).
12F(K,Gc,G s)=Kθ(Gc)µ(Gs)1−θ−µ, (49)
















, with i ∈{ l,c}. (53)
Matching functions are Cobb-Douglas with constant returns to scale. Follow-
ing Manacorda and Petrongolo (1999), we also use a constant returns to scale
production function with three inputs to represent the technological constraints
faced by the ﬁnal ﬁrm17. The utility function is logarithmic. Search functions
are concave and disutility functions are convex. The independent term of Do
represents the disutility of working on a simple job.
We calibrate the model on Belgian quarterly data and the reference years are
1995-199718. As usual in this type of quarterly model, the depreciation rate δ of
capital is 2.5% and the psychological discount factor β is 0.99, which leads to an
annual real interest rate of 4%. Using 1997 Belgian data, Van der Linden and
Dor (2002) estimate the elasticity of matches with respect to vacancies at 0.4
(without skill distinction). We take this estimation for both the simple and the
complex matches (λi =0 .4, with i ∈{ s,c}). The household’s bargaining power
is usually calibrated as the coeﬃcient of unemployment in the matching function
(1−λi)19. We therefore set the households’ bargaining power, for both the low-
skilled bargaining for a simple job and the high-skilled bargaining for a complex
job ηs = ηc =0 .6. The high-skilled working on simple jobs have the same
productivity as the low-skilled, but a stronger bargaining position (since they
can search ”on-the job” for complex jobs and leave). To keep identical wages
for the low-skilled and the high-skilled (working on a simple job), we decrease
the bargaining power of the latter to ηh =0 .5520. We also take the Van der
Linden and Dor (2002) estimation of the replacement ratio (0.34), which gives
wu =0 .6621. As in Sneessens and Shadman (2000), the low-skilled have at most
a lower secondary degree and the high-skilled have at least an upper secondary
degree, and the estimated (for Belgium in 1996) skill fraction α of the population
17This implies a unitary elasticity of substitution between low-tech and high-tech goods.
For the French case, this elasticity is usually estimated between 0.7 and 2.5 (see for instance
Cahuc (2003) for a synthesis). See section 4.3 for a discussion.
18Most data are available for this period. Moreover, Belgium was neither in a recession nor
in a boom.
19See for instance Merz (1995) or Andolfatto (1996). Their motivation is that, in their
simpler model, this sharing rule implies that the decentralized economy gives the same outcome
that the social planner’s problem (Hosios-Pissarides condition).
20We therefore assume that the wages on simple jobs depend on the job rather than the
skill.
21This estimation may seem rather low with respect to others (see OECD (2002) for Euro-
pean estimations). The ratio we used here is however an average for all the unemployed and
therefore takes into account the eligibility criteria.
13transition elasticity duration elasticity Kaitz index
empirical reference 1.5 0.2/1.0 0.58
¯ x = 0 1.7 0.2 0.46
¯ x = 1 1.4 0.9 0.59
¯ x = 2 1.3 1.3 0.61
Transition elasticity: elasticity of the transition probability (from the minimum wage employment
to unemployment) with respect to the minimum wage cost, empirical reference given by Kramarz
and Philippon (2000). Duration elasticity: elasticity of unemployment duration with respect to
the replacement ratio, empirical reference given by Holmlund (1998). Kaitz index: ratio of the
minimum wage to the average wage, empirical reference given by OECD (1998).
Table 1: Sensitivity analysis: model properties depending on the value of ¯ x
is 0.67. We also take their estimations to calibrate the production function, and
set θ =0 .35 and µ =0 .51. The legal nationwide minimum wage is very low
in Belgium and not really binding. In practice, minimum wages constraints are
ﬁxed at the sectoral level. We estimate that 10% of the Belgian workers are
paid these minimum wages (see appendix 2 for an extensive justiﬁcation). wm
is calibrated at 1.14 to reproduce this result.
The matching eﬃciencies, the per-period vacancy costs and the parameters of







chosen to reproduce the observed values of the following 10 variables. In 1996,
the low-skilled (resp. high-skilled) unemployment rate was 20% (resp. 7%) in
Belgium (see Sneessens and Shadman (2000)). Van der Linden and Dor (2002)
estimate a lower bound for the job destruction rate equal to 0.013 (monthly
data). Using this estimate and the fact that simple jobs are more precarious
than complex jobs, we choose the parameters such that the quarterly simple job
destruction rate χl = χh =0 .05 and the quarterly complex job destruction rate
ψ =0 .025. We assume that the proportion of high-skilled on simple jobs is equal
to 10%. If we keep in mind that distinguishing only two skill categories (rather
than three or more) will mechanically and maybe drastically reduce the number
of ”overeducated workers”, our assumption seems realistic compare to empirical
estimations (see for instance Hartog (2000) European estimations and Delmotte,
Van Hootegem, and Dejonckheere (2001) for Belgian ones). The probabilities to
ﬁnd a simple job and a complex job are based on Cockx and Dejemeppe (2002),
and we choose the parameters to respectively have ps =0 .2a n dpc =0 .4. The
probabilities to ﬁll a complex job and a simple job are based on Delmotte, Van
Hootegem, and Dejonckheere (2001), we choose the parameters to respectively
have qs =0 .5a n dqc =0 .5 (see Pierrard and Sneessens (2003) for an extensive
explanation).
As in most of the related literature (see for instance Mortensen and Pissarides
14Population and production
α 0.67 θ 0.35 µ 0.51
Matching and vacancy costs
¯ m
s 0.30 λ
s 0.4 a 0.14
¯ m
c 0.45 λ


















Psychological discount and depreciation rates
β 0.99 δ 0.025







m 1.14 ¯ x 1
Table 2: Numerical parameter values
(1994)), we assume the idiosyncratic shocks are drawn out of a uniform distri-
bution on a unit interval [¯ x, ¯ x+1], with ¯ x ≥ 0. The value of ¯ x is crucial because
it aﬀects the wage distribution and transition probabilities22. In table 1, we
compute the elasticity of the transition probability (from the minimum wage
employment to unemployment) with respect to the minimum wage cost, the
elasticity of unemployment duration with respect to the replacement ratio, and
the Kaitz index (ratio of the minimum wage to the average wage), for diﬀer-
ent values of ¯ x and keeping constant the above-mentioned calibration. Our
model elasticity’s are compared to reference empirical estimations by Kramarz
and Philippon (2000), Holmlund (1998) and OECD (1998) for, respectively, the
transition probability elasticity, the unemployment duration elasticity and the
Kaitz index. Given this sensibility analysis, we eventually choose ¯ x =1 ,i.e. a
uniform distribution F bounded between 1 and 2.
The model calibration yields reasonable values for the remaining endogenous
variables. We obtain 0.05 for the on-the-job search intensity eo and 0.88 for
the high-skilled complex job search intensity ec. Moreover, the minimum wage
is not binding for the complex jobs (Qc is strictly lower than Rc), the average
wage paid on simple jobs represents 55% of the average wage paid on complex
jobs, which is similar to OECD (1996) estimation of wage dispersion in Belgium,
and the steady state minimum wage represents 50% of the average high wage.
As expected, the per-period cost of opening a complex job is slightly higher
22With a low ¯ x, the relative diﬀerence between minimum and maximum productivity levels
((¯ x+1)/¯ x) is large; while with a high ¯ x, relative diﬀerence is narrow. As a result, the higher is
¯ x, the ﬂatter is the bargained wage curve. These diﬀerences in wage dispersion, depending on
the value of ¯ x, explain the variations in properties. Instead of increasing ¯ x, we could obtain
similar results by decreasing the dispersion around ¯ x.




















RR 0.34 ind 0.50 WD 0.55 popmw 0.10
Consumptions and vacancy costs
C ratio 0.47 AVC 0.04
RR: replacement ratio (unemployment beneﬁt over average wage). ind: minimum wage over average
high wage. WD: wage dispersion (average wage paid on simple job over average wage paid on a
complex job). popmw: share of the working population paid at the minimum wage. C ratio: the
low-skilled consumption over the high-skilled consumption. AVC: average vacancy cost over average
annual wage.
Table 3: Implied values for some variables
than the cost of opening a simple job and the average cost represents 3.7% of
the average annual wage, similar to Mortensen and Pissarides (1999). Finally,
the low-skilled per capita consumption represents 47% of the high-skilled per
capita consumption. All the calibration, as well as the implied variable values,
are summarized in tables 2 and 3.
Exogenous deterministic policy process
Although the minimum wage is more rigid than other bargained wages, it is
also regularly adapted (see appendix 2). To take into account both the short-
run rigidity and the regular adaptations, we assume for the minimum wage an
indexation policy with inertia:
wm
t = ind (α0 ¯ wc
t + α1 ¯ wc
t−1 + α2 ¯ wc
t−2 + α3 ¯ wc
t−3 + α4 ¯ wc
t−4), (54)
where ind is the long run indexation parameter of the minimum wage on the
high-skilled wages (see table 3 for the numerical value), and
 4
i=0 αi =1 . W e
indeed see in OECD (1996) that the D9/D1 ratio (ratio of the upper earning
limit of the ninth decile of workers to the upper limit of the ﬁrst decile, i.e. the
ratio of the highest wages to the lowest wages) has remained fairly stable over
the last years. We point out that the choice of the αi has only minor eﬀects on
the transitional dynamics and, of course, none on the steady state. We choose
[α0,α 1,α 2,α 3,α 4]=[ 0 , 0.1, 0.1, 0.3, 0.5].
In the same way, we assume that the unemployment beneﬁts are regularly in-
16dexed on the average wage, using the same policy process:
wu
t = RR (α0 ¯ wt + α1 ¯ wt−1 + α2 ¯ wt−2 + α3 ¯ wt−3 + α4 ¯ wt−4), (55)
where RR is the long run replacement ratio (see table 3) and ¯ wt is the economy
average wage. It is worth noting that, to simplify, we assume that wm
t and wu
t
are taken as exogenous by the ﬁrms and the households.
3.2 Reductions in Employer’s Social Security Contribu-
tions
The model presented in section 2 do not include labor taxation, i.e. the gross
wage (paid by the ﬁrm) is equal to the net wage (received by the worker).
Decreasing labor taxation for the employer is therefore modelized as a wage
subsidy to the employer.
Transitional dynamics
In this subsection, we study a reduction targeted at the very low wages (mini-
mum wage) and a reduction targeted at the high wages. For both policies, we
assume a proportional reduction whose ex ante cost amounts to 0.2% of GDP.
To introduce a proportional reduction targeted at the minimum wage, we only
have to modify wages paid by the intermediate ﬁrms. More precisely, if x<Q l
t,
wl
t(x) in equation (16) becomes (1 − tm)wm




t (x) in equation (17) also becomes (1−tm)wm
t (no change if x>Q h
t ).
(1−tm)wm
t is the wage paid after the policy, by the concerned intermediate ﬁrms.
The concerned workers still receive the wage wm
t and the diﬀerence tmwm
t is paid
by the government23. To close the government budget, the lump-sum tax Tt
paid by the high-skilled household, in equation (25), is increased by the amount
of the policy cost24. The eﬀects of this policy are displayed in the graphs of
ﬁgure 3.
Due to a decrease in the employer’s contributions, targeted at the minimum
wage, some low-productivity simple jobs, that were previously destroyed, are
now retained, and the job destruction rate immediately decreases. After a small
rise during the ﬁrst period following the policy introduction, the job creation
also decreases but less signiﬁcantly than the destruction rate. As a result, net
simple employment increases and we recover empirical results that most of the
employment gains are due to a fall in job destruction rather than an increase
in job creation, and that most of the adjustment occurs after two years25.B e -
cause we have more simple jobs paid at the minimum wage, the average wage








24In section 4.4, we replace the lump-sum tax by a proportional taxation on complex wages.
25Net employment change is deﬁned as the job creation rate minus the job destruction rate
and is represented in the graph as the area between these two curves.



















wage gap and ladder


















































Figure 3: Short-run eﬀects of reductions targeted at the minimum wage (devi-
ations from the initial steady state)
18paid on simple jobs falls (composition eﬀect). On the other hand, the rise in
simple employment (and low-tech goods) automatically improves the marginal
productivity of the high-tech goods, which stimulates the demand for work-
ers on complex jobs, and hence the upward pressure on complex wages. This
widening of the wage gap reduces the job competition, i.e. decreases the ladder
eﬀect. With more jobs available and less competition, the low-skilled unem-
ployment strongly decreases, while the increase in complex jobs is not suﬃcient
to absorb the previously de-qualiﬁed high-skilled workers and the high-skilled
unemployment slightly rises. This policy seems therefore particularly relevant
in countries with high low-skilled unemployment rates. Overall, the higher em-
ployment stimulates the output per capita, but the share of low-skilled workers
increases and this deteriorates the output per worker. The welfare of the low-
skilled remains unchanged (more income but also more work), while the welfare
of the high-skilled strongly increases, since they have much less unemployment
beneﬁts to ﬁnance26. Moreover, we see that the net relative cost (policy cost
plus unemployment beneﬁt cost, over GDP) strongly decreases. In other words,
the policy cost is lower than the sum saved due to less unemployment beneﬁts
to ﬁnance. If we take into account the fact that higher employment increases
labor taxation income for the government, we do not obtain a higher reduction
in the budget cost because GDP increases more rapidly than the labor taxation
income27.
To introduce a proportional reduction targeted at the high wages (all wages paid
on complex jobs), we only have to modify equation (13), where wc
t(x) becomes
(1−tc)wc
t(x), the wage paid after the policy by the concerned intermediate ﬁrms.
However, the concerned workers still receive the same wage wc
t and the diﬀer-
ence tcwc
t is paid by the government28. Again, to close the government budget,
the lump-sum tax Tt paid by the high-skilled household, in equation (25), is in-
creased by the amount of the policy cost. The eﬀects of this policy are displayed
in the graphs of ﬁgure 4.
We observe that both the complex job destruction and job creation rates de-
crease, but the gains in employment are here much more subdued. The reason
is that with Nash bargained wages, a decrease in employer’s taxation leads to a
higher bargained wage. On the simple job market, wages remain stable during
the initial periods (inertia in the minimum wage indexation) and, as a result,
the wage gap widens. However, this widening is short-lived because, after some
periods, the minimum wage is being indexed, and the ladder remains mostly
unchanged. The decrease in unemployment is therefore mainly concentrated
among the high-skilled. Again, the GDP per capita is stimulated by higher
26It means it is more eﬃcient (increase in the welfare) to redistribute income by using ﬁscal
transfers (from the high-skilled to the low-skilled) than by distorting the price mechanism (high
minimum wage). See Saint-Paul (2000) for an extensive discussion about these concepts.
27We assume a tax of 40% on wages paid on complex jobs. This labor taxation income
amounts to 20% of GDP, which seems a realistic assumption in a European economy.
28The value of tc is chosen to obtain an ex ante policy cost of 0.2% of GDP. Formally:
























−3 wage gap and ladder




















































Figure 4: Short-run eﬀects of reductions targeted at high wages (deviations from
the initial steady state)
20”SMIC” low wages high wages all
Sneessens +23.2
& Shadman (2000)
Stockman (2002) +9.5/+16.2 +4.4/+6.2 +2.2/+7.4
Burggraeve +6.2/+9.4
& Du Caju (2003)
Model +59.6 +20.4 +6.3 +9.4
Table 4: Long-run eﬀects on employment (in thousands) of reductions in con-
tributions (of an ex ante cost of 0.2% of GDP), depending on the wages they
are targeted at
employment, while the productivity (GDP per worker) is almost not aﬀected.
Welfare increases for the low-skilled (higher wages), but we see that the gains in
employment (and the lower amount of unemployment beneﬁts associated) are
not suﬃcient to compensate the policy cost, even with the increase in the labor
tax income for the government. The tax burden on the high-skilled rises and
this aﬀects their welfare.
Long-run eﬀects: comparison to previous literature
In this subsection, we compare our long-run results with those of other recent
papers, also focused on the Belgian economy. Table 4 reproduces the long-run
eﬀects on total employment of reductions in employer’s social security contribu-
tions. Depending on the papers, these reductions are targeted at the low wages
(paid to all workers on ”low-tech” jobs), the high wages (paid to all workers
on ”high-tech” jobs) or can be spread across all wages. For each policy of each
paper, we assume that the ex ante cost is equivalent to 0.2% of GDP29.T oe v a l -
uate the eﬀects of the reductions, Sneessens and Shadman (2000), Stockman
(2002) and Burggraeve and Du Caju (2003) use macro-econometric models and
their eﬀects may depend on the assumptions they introduce (see appendix 4 for
a short explanation of their models). The last line of table 4 displays our re-
sults. With respect to the above-mentioned papers, we also simulate a reduction
targeted at the very low wages (minimum wage or ”SMIC”). We have already
explained how we introduce policies focused on the minimum wage and high
wages. To model a policy focused on the low wages, we simply add a propor-
tional reduction tax ts in equations (16) and (17). To model a policy focused
on all wages, we add a proportional reduction tax ta in equations (13), (16)
and (17).
29The policy cost varies depending on the paper but we normalize it by assuming that the
policy eﬀects on employment are linear.
21We see that our estimations lie at the top of the range of the previous esti-
mations. We, moreover, conﬁrm that policies focused on the low wages are
more powerful, in term of employment stimulation, than policies focused on
high wages. The main conclusion is that a policy focused on the very low wages
(minimum wage) has ten times more eﬀects on employment than a policy fo-
cused on high wages30.
Although the eﬀects of reductions at the SMIC level have never been studied
in Belgium, they have already been explored in France, both empirically and
theoretically. If we transpose our results to the French economy, a reduction
similar to those of the ”Jupp´ e reform” would create around 500 000 jobs. Our
results are therefore in line with French empirical micro estimations. They are,
nevertheless, more important than those predicted by the recent theoretical
macro models with matching31. However, contrary to ours, these macro models
assume exogenous job destruction rate (in other words, all employment gains are
due to job creation), which seems contrary to the Cr´ epon and Desplatz (2002)
observations. By ignoring the eﬀects through the decrease in the job destruction
rate, they may well underestimate the total eﬀect on employment.
4 Discussions and Extensions
4.1 Job Competition
Pierrard and Sneessens (2003) argue that job competition (also called ladder
eﬀect or crowding out) is important to understand the high low-skilled unem-
ployment rate. This endogenous job competition is also important to understand
the eﬀects of a reduction in contributions at the minimum wage level, especially
on the respective unemployment rates. Following the introduction of the policy
and the widening of the wage gap (see ﬁgure 3), de-qualiﬁed workers exhibit a
more intensive on-the-job search (their search intensity rises from 5% to 8%)
and the skilled unemployed reduce their search for simple jobs (from 12% to
8%). As a result, the simple jobs held by high-skilled decrease by 32 000 units
and this positively aﬀects the low-skilled employment, which rises by 78 000
units. By ignoring the job competition eﬀect, we would have a less signiﬁcant
reduction in the low-skilled unemployment rate, however, we would not have an
increase in the high-skilled unemployment rate, as in ﬁgure 3.
4.2 Employment Protection
In our model, reductions targeted at the minimum wage strongly aﬀect the job
destruction and, as a result, employment. However, we assume no employment
30See appendix 1 for a similar results with a simpliﬁed labor market.
31Empirical micro papers (Laroque and Salani´ e (2000) or Cr´ epon and Desplatz (2001))
estimate an increase in employment of 475 000 units; while macro estimations are much more
subdued (around 200 000 new jobs), even with a high elasticity of substitution between skills.
22protection and this could explain the job destruction - over? - reaction. In
this section, for simplicity, we start from a simpliﬁed model (only one type of
workers and one type of jobs) but we add an employment protection (in a sense
of a ﬁring tax). We next look at the eﬀects of a decrease of 10% in the minimum
wage, on the job destruction rate and the employment, depending on the value











employment change (left scale)
job destruction change
Figure 5: Eﬀects of a decrease of 10% in the minimum wage, for diﬀerent values
of the ﬁring tax
We see that adding employment protection reinforce the eﬀects on the job
turnover and the employment, i.e.,i ff represents the ﬁring tax, ∂
2JT
∂wm∂f > 0a n d
∂
2N
∂wm∂f > 0. The intuition is that a higher job protection increases the amount
of low-productivity jobs and therefore the share of the population paid at the
minimum wage. In this case, a shock on the minimum wage will produce strong
employment eﬀects.
Adding employment protection to soften the eﬀects of a reduction in employer’s
contributions targeted at the minimum wage seems therefore counter-productive.
An alternative solution could be to introduce ﬁring restrictions ` al aGaribaldi
(1998), although this is not trivial within our modelization.
4.3 Elasticity of Substitution Between Skills
In our model, with assume a unitary elasticity of substitution between the three
production inputs (simple goods, complex goods and capital; see equation (49)
and the calibration section for a justiﬁcation). However, in the French litera-
ture32, it is generally assumed that the complex goods and capital are perfect
32See for instance Laﬀargue (2000), Salani´ e (2000), or Cahuc (2003).
23complement and that the elasticity of substitution between this ”complex aggre-
gate” and the simple goods lies between 0.7 and 2.5. In this section, we follow
the French literature and use the same production function (see appendix 5 for
a detailed development).
e.o.s.=0.7 e.o.s.=2.5 CD function
Simple employment +38.0 +92.4 +46.5
Complex employment +14.8 -14.8 +13.1
Total employment +52.7 +77.6 +59.6
Table 5: Long-run eﬀects on employment (in thousands) of reductions in con-
tributions (for an ex ante cost of 0.2% of GDP) targeted at the minimum wage,
depending on the elasticity of substitution between the skilled and the unskilled
We assume that the complex goods and capital are perfect complement. Table 5
reproduces the eﬀects on employment of reductions in employer’s contributions,
targeted at the minimum wage (for an ex ante cost of 0.2% of GDP), for dif-
ferent values of the elasticity of substitution between the simple goods and the
complex aggregate. In the second column, we assume a low elasticity of sub-
stitution (e.o.s=0.7), while this elasticity is much higher in the third column
(e.o.s=2.5). These results are compared with those obtain with our initial pro-
duction function (CD function).
We see that increasing the elasticity of substitution strengthens the positive
eﬀect of a reduction in contributions on total employment, as also emphasizes
in the French literature. Moreover, with a low elasticity, complex jobs also
beneﬁt from a reduction targeted at the minimum wage, although this result no
more holds with a high elasticity.
4.4 Policy Financed by Labor Taxation
We assume in this paper a lump-sum taxation to ﬁnance the social policies
(unemployment beneﬁts and reductions in contributions). A lump-sum tax does
not introduce distortions in the economy (it only aﬀects the consumption level
by the same amount) and therefore allows to isolate the eﬀects of a reduction
in contributions. This lump-sum tax is, however, not realistic and we instead
assume in this section a proportional tax on the employees’ complex wages to
ﬁnance the policy. Figure 6 reproduces the eﬀects on the unemployment rates,
of reductions targeted at the minimum wage. The diﬀerence, comparing to
ﬁgure 4, is that we use here a taxation on employees’ complex wages rather
24than a lump-sum tax on the high-skilled household.











Figure 6: Short-run eﬀects of reductions targeted at the very low wages, with
high wage taxation (deviations from the initial steady state)
Since the reductions create a budgetary surplus, taxation on the employee’s
complex wages decreases and this also induces a decrease in the bargained wages.
This is in turn favorable to the high-skilled employment. We therefore have a
slight reduction in the high-skilled unemployment rate, which was not the case
with a lump-sum tax.
4.5 Budgetary Surplus
This paper studies the eﬀects of selective reductions in labor taxation, for a
given ex ante cost. We show that a reduction in the minimum wage cost by 5.5%
(reduction allowed within an ex ante cost of 0.2% of GDP) creates a budgetary
surplus, mainly because there is much less unemployment beneﬁts to ﬁnance.
Increasing the reductions will not necessarily lead to a higher budgetary surplus,
since employment is progressively more diﬃcult to create (tightness of the labor
market) and a decrease in unemployment beneﬁt expenses is no longer suﬃcient
to compensate the policy costs. In ﬁgure 7, we compute the budgetary surplus
for diﬀerent values of reductions in the minimum wage cost. We see that the












Figure 7: Budgetary surplus with respect to the level of reductions in contribu-
tions
5 Conclusion
We study in this paper the eﬀects of selective reductions in employer’s social
security contributions. To do so, we construct an intertemporal general equi-
librium model with diﬀerent types of workers (and wages) and search unem-
ployment. With respect to previous literature, our main contribution is to add
to this model endogenous job destruction rates. This seems important since
it is empirically shown that most of the eﬀects on employment, of reductions
in employer’s contributions at the minimum wage level, go through lower job
destruction rather than higher job creation.
Our model, calibrated on Belgian quarterly data, conﬁrm this observation. It
also shows that employment, and especially low-skilled employment, stimula-
tion can be quite important and self-ﬁnanced if the reductions are targeted at
the minimum wage. Decreasing the minimum wage cost seems therefore a good
answer to speciﬁc low-skilled unemployment problems, as it exists in many Eu-
ropean countries. This should however be seen as a short-term policy, since
it decreases the destruction of the less productive jobs and then strongly de-
teriorates the productivity of the economy. We then argue, along with this
short-term policy, in favor of a long-term policy to increase the creation of more
productive jobs.
Another interesting result is that reductions targeted at the minimum wage
are supported (increase in the welfare) by both the low-skilled and the high-
skilled households. It means that, within our modelization, the representative
households prefer to achieve income equality through ﬁscal redistribution (from
the high- to the low-skilled) rather than by rigid labor market institutions (high
minimum wage).
This model could be easily extended to study other types of reductions in em-
26ployer’s contributions (we here only focus on proportional reductions), as well
as more elaborated labor tax than the lump-sum tax. The modelization could
also be further extended by adding some delay to ﬁring, by combining endoge-
nous and exogenous job destruction rates (these two extensions could attenuate
the employment eﬀects through less important decreases in the job destruction
rate), or by introducing an endogenous labor market participation that could
be combined with a more elaborated unemployment beneﬁt representation. By
simplicity, these extensions have been left aside in this paper but could be
promising research venues.
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30Appendix 1: Eﬀects of reductions in labor taxa-
tion in a simple model
We assume a competitive labor market with labor demand Ld a decreasing
function of wage and labor supply Ls an increasing function of wage. The
competitive equilibrium wage is given by Ld(w)=Ls(w). If we introduce a tax
reduction t in employer’s contributions, the new equilibrium becomes:
Ld((1 − t)w)=Ls(w). (56)
By denoting ηd the elasticity of labor demand with respect to wage and ηs the















































Labor supply elasticity to wage is usually estimated to be small and we assume
ηs =0 .2. Labor demand for the low-skilled is more elastic to wage than labor
demand for the high-skilled. We take ηd = −1( r e s p . ηd = −0.2) for the
low-skilled (resp. high-skilled). In the ﬁrst case (low-skilled), a 1% decrease
in employer’s contributions increases wage by 0.8% and labor by 0.2%. In the
second case (high-skilled), a 1% decrease in employer’s contributions increases
wage by 0.5% and labor by 0.1%. Reductions in contributions are therefore
more eﬀective, in employment term, if targeted at the low wages rather than at
the high wages.
If we introduce a minimum wage in this economy, dw/w = 0 and labor is





Ld = −ηd dt
1 − t
. (60)
As a result, increase in labor with ηd = −1 is now 1%.
31Appendix 2: Wage formation in Belgium
Wage formation is Belgium is quite complex and realized at three levels: the
intra-sectoral (national) level, the sectoral level and the individual level. Every
two years, negotiations at the intra-sectoral level determine the legal minimum
wage, as well as the ”wage norm”. More regularly, wage negotiations are also
held within the diﬀerent economic sectors where the legal minimum wage and
the wage norm are taken respectively as lower and upper bounds: sectoral
minimum wages cannot be lower than the legal minimum wage and sectoral
wage increases cannot exceed the limits ﬁxed by the wage norm. Eventually,
wages may, at each period, be (re)negotiated at the individual level, depending
on the demand and supply of labor, or on individual characteristics. This justify
in our model the coexistence of a rigid minimum wage encompassing the legal
and the sectoral ones (although this minimum wage may be regularly adapted),
and of much more ﬂexible bargained wages.
To try to estimate the percentage of the Belgian workers paid at one of the
minimum wages, we base our analysis on the MET (1999) report. The monthly
gross legal minimum wage (called RMMMG: revenu mensuel minimum moyen
garanti) was of 41 660 BEF in 1995. Sectoral minimum wages are on average
estimated to be 22% higher (although they may be much higher, e.g. up to
40% in the energy and construction sectors), which leads to an average gross
minimum wage around 51 000 BEF. Still in 1995, 2% of the workers had a gross
wage between 0 and 44 000 BEF; and 13% of the workers had a gross wage
between 44 000 and 56 000. From this ﬁgures, we can conclude that if only a
very small percentage of the workers is paid at the legal minimum wage, a much
higher percentage is paid at one of the minimum wages.
In Belgium, the gross legal minimum wage represents 50.4% of the median
gross wage, and the estimated gross minimum wage (taking into account the
sectoral minimum wages) is therefore higher (around 60%). This ratio is one of
the highest in the OECD countries. In France, the ratio is of 57.4% and it is
usually estimated that 16% of the workers at paid at the ”SMIC” minimum wage
(see Cahuc and Zylberberg (2001)). Again this allows us to conclude that the
percentage of Belgian workers paid at one of the minimum wage is important.
We ﬁx it at 10% in our calibration.
32Appendix 3: Marginal welfare
The ﬁrst derivative with respect to Nl























The ﬁrst derivatives with respect to Nh
t and Nc
t of equation (24), using equa-
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33Appendix 4: Some previous models calibrated on
Belgian data
Sneessens and Shadman (2000) extended the original NAIRU model to take
into account two types of workers: the high-skilled and the low-skilled. They
econometrically estimate their model and use it to simulate the eﬀects of a
reduction in employer’s contributions, targeted at the low-skilled. Our results
are directly comparable to theirs because we use the same deﬁnitions for low-
skilled (at most lower secondary education) and high-skilled (at least upper
secondary education).
Stockman (2002) uses a new version of the sectoral macro-econometric model
HERMES, developed at the Belgian Federal Planning Bureau. Workers are
either paid at a low wage or at a high wage, and the elasticity of substitution
between low and high wage workers is equal to 1 (as in our production function).
They ﬁx the cut-oﬀ monthly gross wage, between low and high wages, at 1562
￿.
As a result, they obtain 28% of the workers paid at a low wage and 72% paid at a
high wage. This distinction is therefore not far from ours (respectively 33% and
67%). For each policy, two simulations are conducted: one assuming that gross
wages are freely bargained and one assuming that gross wages are not aﬀected
by a reduction in employer’s contributions. Reductions are implemented at
time t and they estimate the eﬀects from time t to time t + 6 (yearly data).
We take their time t + 6 estimations to compare with our long-run results.
More recently, still for the Belgian Federal Planning Bureau, Hendrickx, Joyeux,
Masure, and Stockman (2003) develop an alternative macro-econometric model
(the main diﬀerence is that the wage equation determines the wage cost, while in
HERMES the wage equation determines the gross wage) but they only simulate
a reduction distributed to all workers. Their estimations are slightly lower than
those of Stockman (2002) (we do not reproduce their results in table 3).
To conduct their simulations, Burggraeve and Du Caju (2003) use as macro-
econometric model the Belgian block of the eurosystem’s multicountry model,
developed, as a larger project, within the European System of Central Banks.
They do not introduce skill and wage diﬀerentiation and they only simulate
a reduction for all workers. They conduct several simulations. In table 3,
we reproduce the case where all reductions are eﬀectively used for labor cost
reductions (we do not reproduce their two other cases, where reductions are
entirely oﬀset by increases in gross wage, and where they introduce a ﬁscal
compensation (through VAT or production tax) for the reductions), considering
two limiting scenario: a ”real rule” scenario vs. a ”nominal rule” scenario.
Reductions are implemented at time t and they estimate the eﬀects from time
t to time t + 9 (yearly data). We take their time t + 9 estimations to compare
with our long-run results.
34Appendix 5: A general CES production function
A general CES production function can be written as:




A =[ a3(Gc)τ + a4(γK)τ]
1
τ . (65)
1/(1 − τ) is the elasticity of substitution between Gc and K,1 /(1 − υ)i st h e
elasticity of substitution between Gs and the aggregate quantity A,a n dε, ai
and γ are technical parameters.
If we assume a unitary elasticity of substitution between inputs (τ = υ = 0), it
is easy to show that the production function becomes:
F = ε(Gs)a1(Gc)a2a3(γK)a2a4. (66)
By setting ε =1 ,a1 =1− θ − µ, a2a3 = µ, a2a4 = θ and γ = 1, we see that
equation (66) is equivalent to equation (49). The Cobb-Douglas production
function we use in our simulations is therefore a special case of the general CES
production function (64).
In the French literature, it is usually assumed that complex goods and capital are
perfect complement and that the elasticity of substitution between the simple
goods and the complex aggregate lies between 0.7 and 2.5, i.e. 1/(1 − τ)=0
and 0.7 ≤ 1/(1 −υ) ≤ 2.5. In this case, the production function can be written
as:
F = ε[a1(Gs)υ + a2(Gc)υ]
1
υ , (67)
and the ﬁrst order conditions (34) to (36) become:













Given the values of υ, Gs,a n dGc, the technical parameters ε, a1, a2 and γ
can be calibrated to obtain the wanted values for the variables F, K, ds and dc
(equations (67) to (70)).
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